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I.

Introduction
This Article discusses the benefits and costs of bid

protests, which are legal challenges brought by bidders against
the way the Government has conducted its procurements.1

In the

U.S. federal procurement system, bid protests have existed since
the 1920s.2

Despite its longevity, however, critics have come to

characterize the bid protest process as costly and overly
complex.3

This Article explains why, in the author’s view, the

benefits of the bid protest system substantially outweigh the
burdens it imposes on the procurement system.
II.

The Administrative and Judicial Venues for Filing Bid
Protests in the U.S. Federal System
In 1924, a few companies began writing to the then

relatively new General Accounting Office (GAO)4 to complain that
agencies had improperly awarded contracts to their competitors.5
1

See FAR 33.101.
Daniel I. Gordon, In the Beginning: The Earliest Bid Protests
Filed with the US General Accounting Office, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L.
REV., NA147, at NA147 (2004) [hereinafter In the Beginning].
3
See William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of
Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 461, 461,
491 (1995).
4
Today’s Government Accountability Office was founded in 1921 as
the General Accounting Office. See Budget and Accounting Act,
1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 301, 42 Stat. 20, 23. Effective July
7, 2004, the General Accounting Office’s legal name became the
Government Accountability Office. See GAO Human Capital Reform
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, § 8(a), 118 Stat. 811, 814.
The name change did not alter the acronym “GAO.”
5
See In the Beginning, supra note 2, at NA154-62.
2

3

There was hesitation within the GAO about the appropriateness of
considering complaints by private firms about the federal
procurement process.6

Ultimately, the GAO decided to consider

the complaints as part of its responsibility to ensure that
funds appropriated by Congress are lawfully spent, which is also
known as the Office’s account settlement function.7
Then in 1925, a company wrote to the GAO alleging that
Panama Canal officials had issued a solicitation with
specifications for a truck that were “wired” to a particular
brand name and that thereby unfairly precluded the complaining
firm from fair consideration for the contract.8

The GAO

requested the agency’s views on the matter, and, when the Canal
authorities admitted that they had used the specifications of
one company’s truck in the solicitation,9 the GAO issued the
first published bid protest decision, ruling that the challenged
solicitation was unlawful.10
In the course of the ensuing decades, handling bid protests
became a routine function of the GAO’s Office of General

6

See id. at NA147; Daniel I. Gordon, Annals of Accountability:
The First Published Bid Protest Decision, 39 PROCUREMENT LAW.,
Winter 2004, at 11.
7
In the Beginning, supra note 2, at NA148.
8
Id. at 157-58.
9
Id. at 160-62.
10
Letter to the Gov., the Panama Canal, 5 Comp. Gen. 712, 713
(1926).
4

Counsel.11

Some protests involved potential offerors’ pre-award

challenges to solicitation terms,12 while others represented
post-award challenges in which firms that had competed for a
contract contested the award to another offeror.13
For many years, courts did not consider bid protests, so
that the GAO (and the contracting agencies themselves)
represented the only place to file a protest.14

Then, for three

decades U.S. district courts had bid protest jurisdiction,
beginning with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit’s decision in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer15 and ending with the statutory mandate of the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 that this
jurisdiction “sunset” in 2001.16

11

See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 470.
See, e.g., Letter to Sec’y of War, 16 Comp. Gen. 149, 150
(1936).
13
See, e.g., Letter to Sec’y of Interior, 17 Comp. Gen. 770
(1938).
14
See Robert S. Metzger & Daniel A. Lyons, A Critical
Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism, 2007 WIS. L. REV.
1225, 1229 (2007).
15
424 F.2d 859, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding that bid protests
could be heard in U.S. district courts).
16
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-320, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 3870, 3874-75 (codified as 5 U.S.C.
§§ 571-584 (2000)) (providing for district court jurisdiction
over bid protests to “sunset” on January 1, 2001).
12

5

Meanwhile, from the enactment of the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA)17 until its jurisdiction ended
pursuant to section 5101 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996,18
there was another administrative forum with jurisdiction over
bid protests that pertained to information technology:

the

General Services Administration’s Board of Contract Appeals.19
Finally, a statutory change in 1996 resulted in the Court of
Federal Claims,20 which had only pre-award protest jurisdiction
for many years, gaining post-award jurisdiction as well.21
Consequently, for more than a decade now, the only places
outside the contracting agency where disappointed bidders have
been able to file protests have been the GAO and the Court of
Federal Claims.

From time to time there are differences between

the GAO and the Court of Federal Claims, with respect to both

17

Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2304
(2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 41 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (Supp. IV
2010)).
18
Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5101, 110
Stat. 186, 680.
19
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) both created an
explicit statutory basis for the GAO’s bid protest jurisdiction
and gave the General Services Administration’s Board of Contract
Appeals its limited bid protest authority. Id. § 2741.
20
The Court of Federal Claims was previously called the United
States Claims Court, prior to Congress’s enactment of the
Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-572,
§ 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
21
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act § 12.
6

process and outcome.22

The author views occasional differences

between the two fora as inevitable.

That is particularly the

case where, as here, one forum is administrative and the other
is judicial.

In any event, having two fora hear bid protests

may be healthy for the procurement system.

While the discussion

below regarding the costs and benefits of protests to the
procurement system is focused on the GAO, the analysis should
apply, at least in broad terms, to the Court of Federal Claims
as well.
III. Spread of the Protest Process Outside the U.S.
Before turning to that analysis, it is worth looking
outside the United States, because the protest process has
received substantial attention around the world in recent
years.23

More than ever, a protest system has come to be seen as

a required part of a good public procurement regime.24

22

As

JOHN CIBINIC, JR. ET AL., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1673, 1674
(2011).
23
See Erik A. Troff, The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest
Mechanism: A Model for Bid Challenge Procedures in Developing
Nations, 57 A.F. L. REV. 113, 115-16 (2005) (describing bid
protest mechanisms required by major public procurement
development efforts); see, e.g., David P. Goodwin et al.,
International Procurement, 44 INT’L LAW. 261, 262-64 (2010)
(discussing local protest procedures in Canada).
24
See Troff, supra note 23, at 115-16, 116 n.6 (noting the
international emphasis placed on bid protest mechanisms). It
should be noted that the term “protest” (or “bid protest”) is
rarely used outside the United States; instead, what we would
call protests are called “challenges,” “domestic review
7

evidence of this trend, the U.S. includes a bid protest
provision in the free trade agreements it negotiates.25

For

example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
requires each partner to have a protest forum.26

The World Trade

Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
likewise includes a provision requiring that WTO members that
accede to the GPA have a forum to hear protests (called a
domestic review procedure).27

Finally, there is a protest

provision in Chapter VIII of the model procurement law of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).28

procedures,” “remedies,” or simply ”complaints.” Id. at 115
n.5.
25
Timothy M. Cox, Should the United States Incorporate the
Procurement Integrity Act Into Its Free Trade Agreements?: A
Look At the Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement, 17 SW.
J. INT’L LAW 101, 113 (2010) (noting that all free trade
agreements with the United States require some type of bid
protest mechanism); see generally Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 15, 2013)
(listing all United States Free Trade Agreements in force).
26
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1017, Dec. 17, 1992,
107 Stat. 2066, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1,
1994).
27
See Agreement on Government Procurement, Committee on
Government Procurement, Adoption Of The Results Of The
Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 Of The Agreement On Government
Procurement, Apr. 2, 2012, WT/GPA/113, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GPA%20113%20Decision%20o
n%20the%20outcomes%20of%20the%20negotiations%20under%20Article%2
0XXIV%207.pdf.
28
See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON PUB. PROCUREMENT Ch. VIII (United Nations
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law 2011), available at
8

Perhaps most interesting is the attention bid protests have
received during the past twenty years in the European Union
(EU).

Not mentioned in the EU’s Public Procurement Directives,

protests were first addressed by the European Commission in what
is known as the Remedies Directive.29

Initially issued in 1989,30

the Remedies Directive was revised in 2007.31

The Remedies

Directive has had an enormous impact, requiring all member
states to have a forum that considers protests.32

Furthermore,

the Court of Justice of the European Union has also issued
decisions that have reshaped the protest process in the EU.33

Of

particular importance was the Alcatel decision34 that led to the
requirement (codified in Article 2a of the 2007 revision to the
Remedies Directive) that there be a “standstill” period
(typically ten days) between the announcement of a potential

http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/mlprocurement-2011/ML_Public_Procurement_A_66_17_E.pdf.
29
See Council Directive 89/665/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 2 (EC).
30
Id.
31
See Directive 2007/66/EC, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC With Regard to Improving the
Effectiveness of Review Procedures Concerning the Award of
Public Contracts 2007 O.J. (L 335) 31.
32
See id. at 35.
33
See, e.g., Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria AG v.
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr, 1999 E.C.R. I7671 (1998).
34
Id.
9

awardee and contract signing to allow a window for filing
protests.35
Bid protest procedures have therefore received important
consideration from the international community.

States-side,

however, the U.S. federal protest system has sometimes come
under criticism.36

The following section addresses some of the

misconceptions upon which much of this criticism is based.
IV.

Correcting Misperceptions about Bid Protest Statistics
In the author’s experience, there exist a number of

misperceptions concerning bid protest statistics that deserve
attention, because these misperceptions can taint judgments
about the benefits and costs of protests.

In particular, even

people quite familiar with the federal acquisition system often
believe that protests are more common than they really are, and
they believe, inaccurately, that protesters use the protest
process as a business tactic to obtain contracts from the
Government.37

35

Directive 2007/66/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC With Regard to Improving the
Effectiveness of Review Procedures Concerning the Award of
Public Contracts 2007 O.J. (L 335) 37; Sue Arrowsmith, The Past
and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to
Common Code?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 378 (2006).
36
See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 462.
37
See, e.g., MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40227, GAO BID PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 1
(2009) ("Bid protests filed with the [GAO] have recently
10

A.

Protests Are Rare Events

The frequency of protests requires context in order for any
judgment on the issue to be sensible.

In the author’s

experience, when a Contracting Officer is asked whether, in the
procurements she or he has worked on over the prior few years,
protests were frequent, an affirmative answer is often provided;
but if one asks how many procurements the Contracting Officer
has worked on during that period, that number often dwarfs the
number of protests.

Put another way, while the numerator (the

absolute number of protests) is important, the denominator (the
total number of procurements) is critical to determining whether
it is reasonable to say that protests frequently occur.

In

assessing the frequency of bid protests in the federal
procurement system, there are difficulties with both the
denominator (the number of federal procurements that occur each
year) and the numerator (the number of protests filed each
year).

received increased congressional scrutiny due to recent protests
of high-profile awards and reports that the number of protests
is increasing."); Nick Wakeman, Bid Protest Dilemma Continues,
WASH. TECH. (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://washingtontechnology.com/blogs/editorsnotebook/2012/11/bid-protest-dilemma.aspx (“My feelings are
mixed because I believe there are too many bid protests. I’ve
heard plenty of comments from industry people who say bid
protests are a common tactic by losing incumbents to extend
their work on a contract because the transition to the winner is
delayed while the protest winds its way through the process.”).
11

Regarding the denominator, perhaps surprisingly, there are
no good statistics on the number of federal procurements.38

Any

such count would need to include, not only the number of
contracts awarded each year, but also any protestable task and
delivery orders awarded.39

The latter category includes all

orders placed under the General Services Administration (GSA)
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) and orders issued under multipleaward indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ)
contracts, where the orders have a value above $10 million.40

38

One such study, on federal procurement statistics, was
conducted by the RAND Corporation. See THOMAS LIGHT ET AL., RAND
PROJECT AIR FORCE, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY BID PROTESTS IN AIR
FORCE SOURCE SELECTIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES 12 (2012), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012
/RAND_TR883.pdf. As explained in greater detail later in this
Article, the author believes that the RAND Corporation study’s
estimate of annual procurements made by the Air Force may
represent a significant underestimation. See infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
39
See generally supra note 22, at 1678 (discussing protestable
task and delivery orders).
40
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) amended the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA)
to grant GAO jurisdiction, for three years, to hear protests
concerning task or delivery orders valued at more than $10
million. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 843, 122 Stat. 3, 237-39 (codified
as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f) (Supp. IV 2010)); Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108
Stat. 3243, 3252-53, 3264. The FY 2011 NDAA included a
provision that extended, to September 30, 2016, the GAO’s
jurisdiction to hear protests concerning the issuance of a task
or delivery order under Title 10 of U.S. Code (which essentially
covers defense agencies). Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §
825, 124 Stat. 4137, 4270 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2304c (e)
12

A recent RAND Corporation study of Air Force procurements
that were protested to the GAO indicated that approximately
20,000 contracts with at least one transaction over $25,000 were
awarded by the Air Force in 2008, representing approximately $63
billion.41

Since overall procurement spending in 2008 was over

$500 billion42 (eight times the amount spent by the Air Force
alone), that would suggest that the overall number of contracts
awarded was approximately 160,000.

The author suspects that the

number is low and that a better estimate, including FSS orders
and ID/IQ orders above $10 million, would probably substantially
exceed 250,000.43

For the purpose of this Article’s analysis,

however, it will be assumed that the total number of federal
contracts and protestable orders awarded in a year is 200,000.
With respect to the numerator (the number of protests
filed), there has been confusion due to a methodological anomaly

(Supp. V 2011)). The FY 2012 NDAA did the same thing for
agencies covered by Title 41 of the U.S. Code (which essentially
covers civilian agencies). National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 813, 125 Stat. 1298,
1491 (2011) (codified at 41 U.S.C. 4106(f) (Supp. V. 2011)).
41
LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 12. It is not clear if RAND’s
analysis took into account task and delivery orders, but the
reference to “contracts” suggests that it did not. See id.
42
Prime Award Spending Data: FY 2008, USASPENDING.GOV (Nov. 23,
2012),
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2008.
43
This estimate is based on the author’s experience, including
familiarity with the use of the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS)
and indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts.
13

at the GAO that is worth explaining.

Since the days when

protest filings were tracked on 3” x 5” cards, the GAO has
counted cases in a manner that can cause people to believe that
protest numbers are higher than they actually are.44

When a

company files a protest challenging the terms of a solicitation,
the GAO assigns it a docket number, referred to as a “B number,”
because it begins with a “B” (for example, B-123456).45

If the

protester later learns new information that constitutes a new
ground of protest and files a supplemental protest of that same
solicitation’s terms, the GAO will docket that as B-123456.2.46
If another potential offeror also protests the solicitation’s
terms, the GAO will docket that other offeror’s initial protest
as B-123456.3 and its supplemental protest (if filed) as B123456.4.47

However those pre-award protests are resolved, once

the agency awards a contract, a losing competitor may file a
protest, which the GAO will docket as B-123456.5; if there is a
supplemental protest once the protester sees the agency report,

44

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-401197, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS 5-6 n.8 (2009) [hereinafter
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS] (describing the discrepancy
between the number of protests that the GAO reports as filed,
and the number of procurements that are actually protested).
45
Id. The way “B numbers” are assigned and counted, and the
resulting overstating of protest numbers, appears to be unique
to the GAO and thus would not affect statistics at the Court of
Federal Claims. See id.
46
See id.
47
See id.
14

it will be docketed as B-123456.6.48

And finally, if another

losing competitor files a protest and then supplements it, those
protests will be docketed as B-123456.7 and B-123456.8,
respectively.49

Overall, the GAO’s statistics will indicate

eight protests, even though only one procurement has been
protested.50

In the author’s experience, eight protests of one

procurement would be unusual, whereas two or three protests of
one procurement would be more routine.
This practice suggests that when the GAO reports the number
of protests filed in a year, the reported number substantially
overstates the number of procurements actually protested.

For

Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, for example, while the GAO reported 1,652
cases were filed,51 elsewhere the GAO reported that 1,027
procurements were protested in that period.52

48

In other words,

See id.
See id.
50
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-251R, GAO’S BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 2 n.1 (2008)
[hereinafter GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT].
51
Id. at 2. The number of cases filed as reported in the GAO’s
annual reports also includes requests for reconsideration of a
prior GAO decision as well as requests for reimbursement of
costs. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-162SP,
GAO’S BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 1
(2012) [hereinafter GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT].
52
See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 7.
This figure is derived from adding 416 non-Department of Defense
(DoD) protests and 611 DoD protests. Additionally, the report
explains, “[F]or purposes of counting the number of protests
filed, we eliminated from our count multiple iterations of the
same ‘B’ number. As a consequence, the number of protests in
49

15

the GAO indicated that, on average, there were approximately 1.6
docket numbers assigned (“cases filed”) per protested
procurement.53

Assuming that this ratio is stable over time, it

would mean that the 2,353 cases filed in FY 201154 represented
approximately 1,470 protested procurements.

While the number of

federal procurements was probably not the same in FY 2008 and FY
2011, if we nevertheless assume, for the sake of simplicity and
because this is only a rough estimate, that there were 200,000
procurements in each of those two years, that would suggest that
0.51% of procurements were protested in FY 2008 and 0.74% were
protested in FY 2011.55

In other words, between approximately

99.3% and 99.5% of procurements were not protested.56
This calculation is supported by the recent RAND
Corporation study mentioned above.57

In that study, researchers

at the RAND Corporation found that, in the Air Force, “[t]he
number of [GAO] protests as a percentage of total contract
awards has fallen fairly steadily from about 1.7[%] in FY 1995

this report reflects the number of procurements challenged in a
given fiscal year.” Id. at 5-6 n.8.
53
See id. at 7; GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
54
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-199SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 4 (2011) [hereinafter
GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT].
55
See id.; GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
56
See GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2; GAO FY
2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
57
LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 1.
16

to 0.5[%] in FY 2008.”58

That is to say, as of 2008, 99.5% of

Air Force procurements went forward without being protested to
the GAO.59

Even if the GAO protests for some other agencies’

procurements were twice as common as for the Air Force (and
there is no reason to assume that that is the case), it would
still be true that 99% of these other agencies’ procurements
went forward without being protested to the GAO.
While the RAND Corporation study refers to GAO protests,
including the Court of Federal Claims would not alter the
picture, since the court receives fewer than one-tenth the
number of protests each year that the GAO receives.60

And while

protesters can file protests within the Air Force, and
notwithstanding that statistics on the number of those “agencylevel protests” are not available,61 there is no reason to
believe that they would increase the total percentage of
protested Air Force procurements much above 0.5%.62

58

Id.
See id.
60
See Michael J. Schaengold et al., Choice of Forum for Federal
Government Contract Bid Protests, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 243, 255-59
(2009) (noting the number of protests filed at GAO and the Court
of Federal Claims in each year from 2001 to 2007). For example,
in FY 2008 1,652 bid protests were filed at the GAO. Id. at
255. In the same year, only 85 had been filed with the Court of
Federal Claims (CoFC). Id. at 259.
61
See id. at 254-55; Troff, supra note 23, at 146 n.170.
62
See LIGHT ET AL., supra note 38, at 1.
59

17

It is, of course, true that very high-dollar procurements
are much more likely to be protested: the higher the dollar
value, the greater the likelihood of a protest.63

For a company

that loses the competition for a $100 million contract, with all
the bid and proposal costs that competing entails, the
additional cost of filing a protest may seem minimal, so that
filing a protest can be very tempting.

That does not change the

overall picture, however, that bid protests are rare.
What about the mantra we often hear about increases in
protest numbers?

It is true that the GAO has reported a

substantial increase in the number of cases filed over the past
few years,64 but even if the numbers doubled, from .5% of
procurements to 1%, it would still mean that something like 99%
of procurements are not protested.

In terms of absolute

numbers, the GAO has reported that the number of cases rose from
1,327 in FY 2006 to 2,353 in FY 2011, an increase of more than
70%.65

Adjusted to eliminate the overcounting explained above,66

63

See Memorandum from Daniel I. Gordon, Adm’r for Fed.
Procurement Policy, Office of Fed. Procurement Policy, to Chief
Acquisition Officers, Senior Procurement Execs., & Chief Info.
Officers 7 (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Myth-Busting].
64
See, e.g., GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
65
Compare GAO FY 2008 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 50, at 2
(noting that 1,327 bid protests were filed in FY 2006), with GAO
FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4 (noting that 2,353
bid protests were filed in FY 2011). It may be worth keeping in
mind that the number of cases filed at the GAO was higher in the
1990s. For example, the GAO reported 2,529 cases in FY 1995 and
18

that would represent an increase from approximately 830 to
approximately 1,470 protested procurements (representing the
same percentage increase).67

During that same period, however,

federal procurement spending has increased from $432 billion in
FY 2006 to $537 billion in FY 2011.68

Put another way, in FY

2006, there were approximately 1.92 protests for each billion in
federal procurement spending, while in FY 2011, there were 2.74
protests per billion.69

Those figures are similar to the ones

that the GAO provided in a congressional report in 2009, when it
stated that the number of protested procurements per billion
dollars in Department of Defense contract spending ranged from

2,286 in FY 1996. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-158766, GAO’S
BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 1 (1996); see
also BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 7.
66
See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5-6
n.8.
67
These figures are derived by dividing the figures reported by
the GAO, see supra note 65, by 1.6. The figures therefore take
into account the 1.6 docket numbers assigned per protested
procurement. See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note
44, at 7.
68
Compare Prime Award Spending Data: FY 2006, USASPENDING.GOV
(Nov. 23, 2012),
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2006, with Prime Award Spending Data: FY
2011, USASPENDING.gov (Nov. 23, 2012),
http://usaspending.gov/?q=explore&fromfiscal=yes&typeofview=deta
ilsummary&fiscal_year=2011.
69
These figures are derived by dividing the number of total
protests, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, by the total
number of dollars spent on federal procurements for each
respective year, see supra note 68.
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1.4 to 1.9 during the period FY 2004 to FY 2008.70

While the FY

2011 figure reflects an increase, the number of protests for
each billion in federal procurement spending is still extremely
low: fewer than three protests for each billion dollars that the
Government spends on contracts.
B.

It is Rare for a Protester to Win a Protest, and Even
Rarer for a Winning Protester to go on to Obtain the
Contract at Issue in the Protest

Here again, the GAO’s methodology risks misleading
observers.

The GAO reports a “sustain” rate (that is, the rate

at which the GAO rules in favor of the protester and sustains
the protest) that has ranged, between 2007 and 2011, from 16% to
27%.71

That sounds like protesters do fairly well, but the full

picture is not so favorable to protesters.

First, the sustain

rate has been dropping nearly consistently, falling from 27% in
FY 2007 to 16% in FY 2011.72

Second, the sustain rate is

calculated only among the cases for which the GAO issues a
70

BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 9.
RALPH O. WHITE, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-520SP, GAO
BID PROTEST OVERVIEW 2 (2011) [hereinafter GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW].
72
Id. While the GAO’s report on FY 2012 protests indicates a
higher sustain rate of 18.6%, it also acknowledges that many of
the sustained protests (18 of the 106 reported sustains) related
to one small-business issue, which led to protests by one small
business raising that one issue accounting for 15 of the
sustained protests (including 8 of them in one 2.5 page
decision). See GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at 1,
5; Aldevra, B-406774 et al., 2012 CPD ¶ 240 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 21,
2012). If those carbon-copy cases are treated as one, the
sustain rate for FY 2012 falls back to approximately 16%, even
without regard to the double-counting of B numbers.
71
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decision on the merits, as the GAO’s annual reports
demonstrate.73

That means that, in FY 2010, for example, the GAO

did not sustain 19% of 2,299 cases; rather, it sustained 19% of
441 decisions on the merits (the 441 figure being based on the
GAO’s protest overview report of 2011).74

Third, that percentage

is distorted by the methodology of counting multiple B numbers
separately because, in the author’s experience, protests that
are sustained typically have more B numbers than protests that
are denied.75

For example, in FY 2010, the GAO reported 441

decisions on the merits, of which 82 were reported as sustained
protests.76

But a count of actual decisions (counting each

decision as one, even if it resolves two or more B numbers)
reveals that there were actually 282 decisions on the merits,
rather than 441, and that of these only 45 decisions sustained
the 82 protests that the GAO reported as having been sustained.77

73

See, e.g., GAO FY 2011 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
See GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW, supra note 72, at 2.
75
See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5
n.8.
76
GAO BID PROTEST OVERVIEW, supra note 71, at 2.
77
A note on the methodology used: A Westlaw search for GAO
decisions issued with the terms “Matter of” and “protest”
between October 1, 2009, and September 30, 2010, produced 310
results. Sixteen of those were decisions on requests for
reconsideration or on cost claims, leaving 294 protest
decisions. Twelve of those were published dismissals of
protests, leaving 282 decisions sustaining or denying protests.
Finally, only 45 of these decisions resulted in the sustaining
of the underlying protest or protests at issue, which accounted
74
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That represents a 16% sustain rate, rather than the 19% rate
that the GAO reported.78
Thus far, this analysis means that, among the hundreds of
thousands of federal procurements that occurred in FY 2010,
there were only 45 procurements for which the GAO sustained bid
protests.79

The next stage, though, offers even worse news for

protesters, and it is surprising how little is reported about

for the overall 82 sustained protests reported by the GAO in its
bid protest overview report of 2011. See id.
78
See id.
79
The 45 figure slightly overstates the number of procurements
that were actually successfully protested. In one instance, the
GAO issued two decisions on the same day sustaining two
different companies’ protests of the same contract. See
McCarthy/Hunt, JV, B-402229.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 68 (Comp. Gen. Feb.
16, 2010); B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010
CPD ¶ 69 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 2010). In another procurement,
the GAO sustained a protest in March 2010, and then after the
agency took corrective action, the GAO sustained another protest
of the same procurement. See Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure
Recovery Consultants, LLC, B-401679 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 77 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 10, 2010) (initial decision issued in March 2010);
Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, LLC, B401679.9 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 211 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 8, 2010)
(decision issued in September 2010 following agency corrective
action). In a third procurement, one firm successfully
protested award to another firm, but then the earlier awardee
successfully protested award to the firm that was the prior
protester, leading to two sustained protests in the same
procurement. See Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., B-401773, 2009
CPD ¶ 229 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 10, 2009) (agency implemented
recommendation and then made award to protester, but that award
was successfully protester by earlier awardee in Rapiscan Sys.,
Inc., B-401773.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15,
2010)). Consequently, then, the true number of successfully
protested procurements could more accurately be said to be 42.
The author, however, uses 45 in this Article, in order to track
the 45 decisions issued by the GAO.
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it.

What happened in those 45 procurements, after the GAO

sustained the protests?

Did the protester that was successful

in the GAO litigation succeed in obtaining the contract?
answer: rarely.

The

The FY 2010 numbers have been selected here for

further study, because enough time should have passed for final
actions in the underlying procurements to be available.

That

said, discovering the final action on a contract can be
challenging, because information on what ultimately happened
after each one of the sustained protests is not readily
available.

Enough is known, however, to give a fairly clear

picture of protesters winning at the GAO but nonetheless not
receiving the contested contracts.80

In four of the 45

decisions, the GAO did not recommend any corrective action in
the protested procurement, either because the contract had
already been performed or for other reasons.81

In an additional

three decisions, the GAO did recommend corrective action in the
procurement, but the agency declined to follow the GAO’s

80

The GAO does not track information on which company ultimately
receives a contract after the GAO has sustained a protest. The
author, working with student research assistants at The George
Washington University Law School, has endeavored to obtain
information for the post-protest outcome of each of the
procurements in which the GAO sustained protests in FY 2010, and
the results to date are set out in the text here. The effort to
track down every case continues through Freedom of Information
Act requests to the respective agencies.
81
See infra Appendix A (decisions A1-A4).
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recommendation.82

In 23 additional decisions, the GAO

recommended corrective action and the agency followed the GAO’s
recommendation, but the agency then confirmed award to the same
company as before or took some other action that did not award
to the protester, such as awarding to a third company or
cancelling the requirement entirely.83

In only eight cases

identified to date did the protester apparently obtain the
contested contract,84 and in one additional case, the agency did
commit to resoliciting using the size standard sought by the
protester.85

While the ultimate outcome has yet to be determined

in the procurements covered by the remaining six decisions,86
this much is clear: winning a protest is far from ensuring that
a protester will win the contract that it seeks.

82

See infra Appendix A (decisions A5-A7); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-211SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (2010). GAO’s Bid Protest Annual
Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2012 identified 18
protests where the agency declined to follow GAO’s
recommendation. GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at
1.
83
See infra Appendix B (decisions B1-B23).
84
See infra Appendix C (decisions C1-C8).
85
In the additional case noted, listed in the appendix under C9,
the protester had challenged the agency’s refusal to amend the
solicitation to use a small business size standard called for by
the Small Business Administration’s Office of Hearings and
Appeals; in sustaining the protest, the GAO recommended that the
agency amend the solicitation to conform to that size standard.
Eagle Home Med. Corp., B-402387, 2010 CPD ¶ 82 (Comp. Gen. Mar.
29, 2010).
86
See infra Appendix D (decisions D1-D6).
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Experienced practitioners may point out that the GAO
reports a high “effectiveness rate,” which would suggest that
the picture is far better than this for protesters.87

That

“effectiveness rate,” which was reported as 42% for FYs 2010,
2011, and 2012,88 combines the sustained protests described above
as well as cases where agencies took voluntary “corrective
action,” without action by the GAO, so that the GAO closed its
files without issuing a decision.89

There is no publicly

available information on that large universe of protests where
the GAO was told that the protester “obtain[ed] some form of
relief,” as the GAO writes in a footnote to FY 2012 annual
report.90

In particular, there is no way to know whether the

protesters ultimately obtained the contracts at issue, and
discovering the outcome in each of the affected procurements
would challenge even the most diligent researchers because, as
far as the author knows, the GAO does not publicly disclose any
information about the cases that it closes due to agencies’
voluntary corrective action.91

There is, however, no obvious

87

See generally GAO FY 2012 BID PROTEST REPORT, supra note 51, at 5
(noting the “effectiveness rate” for FY 2012).
88
Id.
89
Id. at 5 n.4.
90
Id.
91
For example, in the GAO’s most recent Performance
Accountability report, the GAO notes that it did not issue
formal decisions because the agencies took voluntary corrective
action. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-2SP, PERFORMANCE AND
25

reason that an agency would be more likely to award a contract
to a protester whose case ends without a GAO decision than after
the GAO rules in a protester’s favor.
V.

Costs of the Bid Protest Process
Protests impose litigation costs on the parties, including

attorney costs, although the author is unaware of data regarding
those costs.

Moreover, even when a bid protest is denied, it

usually holds up the protested acquisition.

Specifically, when

a protester files in time to trigger the automatic stay under
CICA, the agency must hold off on awarding the contract at issue
(for pre-award protests) or direct the awardee to stop work (for
post-award protests).92

The automatic stay for protests filed

with the GAO can last up to 100 days,93 which is generally longer
than the period of time other jurisdictions worldwide allow for
their bid protest processes.94

Even if the GAO dismisses a

ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012 46 (2012). The GAO does not,
however, discuss what action was taken. See id.
92
31 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006).
93
Id. § 3554(a)(1).
94
See generally GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: AN OVERVIEW
OF REGULATION IN 40 JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE (Hans-Joachim Prieß et al.
eds., 2012) (discussing bid protests processes in various
countries worldwide). As examples, in France, where contracts
may not be awarded until the conclusion of a “standstill”
provision, an administrative judge has only 20 days from the
conclusion of the standstill period to decide, id. at 106,
Ghana’s administrative authority is given 21 days to decide
complaints, id. at 123, Macedonia’s Appeals Commission must
decide cases within 15 days of receiving documentation, id. at
175, Portugal’s administrative review takes about 3 weeks, id.
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protest, the dismissal can take several weeks, and even the most
promptly dismissed protests may trigger a CICA stay that is in
place for at least a few days.95

In short, the CICA stay does

disrupt procurements.
However, the CICA stay applies only to a small percentage
of all federal procurements.

As discussed above, in FY 2011,

approximately 1,470 procurements were protested to the GAO.96
While specific information is not publicly available, it is
likely that not all of these 1,470 protested procurements would
have been stayed, given that only protests filed within
specified deadlines trigger a CICA stay.97

At least some of

these 1,470 protests were untimely filed for GAO protest
purposes, so that they were dismissed (indeed, timeliness is one
of the GAO’s most common bases for dismissing protests98) and
even some of the protests that were timely filed may have been
filed too late to trigger a CICA stay.99

For example, a protest

filed six to ten days after a debriefing will usually be found
timely for the GAO’s filing purposes, but it will not trigger a

at 209, and Ukraine’s administrative review must be completed
within 30 working days of receipt of a complaint, id. at 247.
95
See BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 4.
96
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
97
See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4).
98
See Daniel I. Gordon, Dismissals of Bid Protests at the
General Accounting Office, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2002, at 15,
16.
99
See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4).
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CICA stay, because a protest must be filed within five days of a
debriefing to trigger a stay.100
Moreover, the fact that a protest has triggered a CICA stay
does not mean that the procurement will be on hold for 100 days.
Most protests are resolved well before the 100th day, which is
the maximum length of time the GAO has for resolving a
protest.101

In 2009, the GAO reported to Congress that it

“consistently closed more than half of all [Department of
Defense (DoD)] protests within 30 days.”102

While that report

related to protests of DoD procurements,103 there is no reason to
believe that protests of civilian agencies’ procurements (which
are fewer in number than DoD protests104) take longer for the GAO
to close.105

A CICA stay may end because the protester has

withdrawn the protest, or because the GAO has dismissed the
case.106

When an agency takes corrective action, that also ends

the stay, but, of course, the corrective action itself will

100

See id. § 3553(d)(4)(B) (noting that a protest must be filed
within five days of a requested and required debriefing in order
to trigger a CICA stay); 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(2) (2012) (noting
that a protest must be filed within ten days of requested and
required debriefing in order to be timely at the GAO).
101
31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (requiring the GAO to resolve protests
within 100 days after they are filed); BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE
PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 5.
102
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 10.
103
Id. at 5 n.7.
104
See id. at 7.
105
See id. at 5 n.7.
106
Id. at 4, 10.
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generally delay progress in the procurement.107

Even for the

minority of protests that make it to the published decision
stage, the GAO has reported that, on average, it issues a
decision within 80 days.108
Not only is the delay caused by the CICA stay shorter than
it may appear, when a delay, even a relatively short one, could
cause harm, CICA provides a mechanism for agencies to move
forward with protested procurements while protests remain
pending.109

This “override” mechanism is available to agencies

and is used, although information on the frequency of overrides
is not readily available.110
Truly long procurement delays lasting for months really
only occur when the GAO issues a decision sustaining a protest
and the agency implements the GAO’s recommendation, which
typically calls for the agency to re-do at least part of the
107

MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40227, GAO BID
PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 (2011).
108
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-208R, GAO BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 2 (2005). The
citation refers to information for 2004; subsequent reports have
not reported this information.
109
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c)(2), (d)(3)(C) (2006) (authorizing
the head of a procuring activity to override the automatic CICA
stay in specified circumstances).
110
For FY 2002, the last year that the GAO included information
on overrides in its annual report on protests, the GAO reported
that, with respect to the 1,101 protests filed that year, there
were 65 instances of agencies’ using their override authority
to move forward with the procurement, notwithstanding the
protest. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-427R, BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 3, 4 (2003).
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competition for the contract.111

The universe of such cases,

however, is quite small: as explained above, there are only a
few dozen sustained protests in a year (as noted above, there
were 45 decisions in which the GAO sustained protests in FY
2010),112 and, of those, some do not lead to delay in the
procurement after the GAO has issued its decision, either
because the decision did not contain a recommendation for
corrective action or because the agency declined to follow the
GAO’s recommendation.113

That leaves a relatively small number

of procurements, which the author estimates is certainly fewer
than 40 out of the 200,000 procurements per year estimate used
in this Article, in which there is any substantial delay due to
a successful protest.114
Finally, in the author’s view, there is adequate
justification for a substantial delay in a procurement where the
GAO has determined that the agency violated procurement law, and
that the violation has harmed the protester.

At the very least,

any delay that such an agency’s unlawful action has caused
should not be blamed on the bid protest system.
Critics of the protest system may also view the GAO’s
authority to recommend that successful protesters be reimbursed
111
112
113
114

See
See
See
See

31 U.S.C. § 3554(b)(1)(B).
discussion supra Part IV.B.
discussion supra Part IV.B.
discussion supra Part IV.A.
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the costs of filing and pursuing their protests, including costs
attributable to attorneys’ fees, as another cost of associated
with bid protests.115

This situation arises only when the GAO

finds that a protest is clearly meritorious, which means that
the contracting agency violated procurement law to the detriment
of the protester, and when the agency has unduly delayed taking
corrective action.116

In the author’s view, reimbursing

protesters for their actions as “private attorneys general” is
justifiable.117

In any event, the reimbursable rates for

attorneys’ fees in those situations are now capped, except for
small business protesters.118
That said, critics point to abuse of the protest system in
particular contexts as causes for concern.

115

Specifically, there

See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(1)(A)-(B) (permitting the
Comptroller General to recommend that the procuring agency pay
successful protesters’ protest related fees).
116
See, e.g., Advanced Envtl. Solutions, Inc.—Costs, B-296136.2,
2005 CPD ¶ 121, at 2-3 (Comp. Gen. June 20, 2005) (noting that
protest costs may be awarded where an agency unduly delayed
taking corrective action on a meritorious protest); Takota
Corp.—Costs, B-299600.2, 2007 CPD ¶ 171, at 3 (Com. Gen. Sept.
18,2007) (finding no need to award attorney fees because Coast
Guard complied with regulations by swiftly taking corrective
actions).
117
See generally Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859,
864 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing the role of “private attorneys
general in monitoring compliance with federal procurement law).
118
31 U.S.C. § 3554(c)(2). Under CICA, only small businesses
may be reimbursed attorneys’ fees at a rate over $150 dollars
per hour unless the contracting agency and the GAO find that a
higher reimbursement of attorneys’ fees at a higher rate is
warranted. Id.
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are persistent complaints that abuse arises in the form of
“frivolous” protests, and the author has often heard calls for
imposing sanctions on firms that file frivolous protests.119

In

the 2009 report to Congress on DoD procurements, the GAO
responded to a request from the House Armed Services Committee
to address frivolous protests filed in connection with DoD
procurements.120

The GAO pointed out that the fact that a

protest is denied or even dismissed does not mean that it is
frivolous; instead, the GAO expressed the view that only a
protest filed in bad faith should be viewed as frivolous.121

In

any event, the GAO reported that it did not “categorize protests
as frivolous,” and therefore it had no data on the number of
frivolous protests filed.122

It did point out, however, that

contracting agencies rarely assert that protests are
frivolous.123

In a footnote, the GAO indicated that the last

reported decision noting that an agency had characterized a
protest as frivolous was issued in 1996, and that in that case,

119

See Metzger & Lyons, supra note 14, at 1240-41; Jonathan R.
Cantor, Note, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for
Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 172 (1997)
(recounting proposed regulations aimed at preventing “frivolous”
protests).
120
BID PROTESTS INVOLVING DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS, supra note 44, at 11-15.
121
Id. at 11-12.
122
Id. at 12.
123
Id. at 12 n.13.
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the agency subsequently acknowledged that the evaluation scheme
used in the protested procurement was flawed.124
In its 2009 report, the GAO asserted that its practice of
promptly dismissing protests indicated that there was no problem
with frivolous protests.125

The GAO also expressed concern that

any effort to impose sanctions on frivolous protests (such as
imposing a fine or requiring the protester to reimburse the
Government for costs incurred in defending against the protest)
would risk “the unintended consequence of discouraging
participation in federal contracting and, in turn, limiting
competition.”126

The GAO also pointed out that penalties could

not properly be imposed on “frivolous” protesters without adding
a new layer of litigation, for which the GAO would then need to
determine whether protesters had filed their protests in bad
faith.127

Besides the burden that such litigation would place on

the GAO, distracting it from its focus on resolving protests as
quickly as possible, a new layer of litigation could impose
additional costs on agencies and protesters, the burden for
which might fall disproportionately heavily on small businesses
and protesters not represented by counsel that may have

124
125
126
127

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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protested in good faith but acted with a misunderstanding of the
facts or the law.128
Those who allege that some protesters abuse the system
sometimes point to one scenario in particular: situations where
a service contractor has lost a competition for a follow-on
contract and then files a protest in order to continue working
during the period of the CICA stay.129

This concern would be

particularly great if: (1) many protests were found to have been
filed by service-contract incumbents that had lost competitions
for follow-on contracts, and (2) their protests were completely
without merit, but (3) the GAO was so slow in resolving the
protests that the incumbent was able to continue performing well
after its contract had been due to expire.

However, the author

is not aware of any data suggesting that many protests meet
these conditions.

The appropriate response, in any event, would

appear to be to press the GAO to continue (or intensify) its
efforts to resolve protests promptly, not to create a new round
of litigation about the imposition of sanctions, and certainly
128

Id. It is worth noting that protesters have only limited
information about what happened during a procurement at the time
that the strict time limits require them to decide whether to
file a protest, because many agencies disclose to firms that
lost competitions for contract only the bare minimum required by
law. See generally FAR 15.505, .506 (requiring pre-award and
post-award de-briefings).
129
See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 3, at 489 (describing this
type of criticism); Keeton Corrs., Inc. v. United States, 59
Fed. Cl. 753, 754-55 (2007).
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not to limit or abolish vendors’ right to have an independent
body consider their claims of unlawful action by contracting
agencies.
The final category of costs often associated with the
protest system concerns sequential protests, where a protester
loses a protest at the GAO and then protests at the Court of
Federal Claims.130

Presumably, the situation could be made to

sound worse by imagining that many cases protesting procurements
are first brought to the contracting agency, then to the GAO,
then to the Court of Federal Claims, and finally to the Federal
Circuit.131

This scenario is mere speculation, however, with no

evidence that the nightmarish four-fora pattern occurs often.
Indeed, even when it does occur, it is not clear that the
procurement would always be disrupted, since there might be no
CICA stay at the GAO,132 and the courts would certainly have

130

See Schaengold et al., supra note 60, at 318 (noting the
possibility of sequential protests); see, e.g., Axiom Res.
Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (where protester was unsuccessful at the GAO and then
sought review by the Court of Federal Claims).
131
See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d 644,
646-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (where a disappointed bidder protested
to the Army, the successful bidder protested the Army’s
corrective action to the GAO, the disappointed bidder then
protested the GAO’s decision to the Court of Federal Claims, and
the successful bidder appealed the Court of Federal Claims’
decision to the Federal Circuit).
132
There may be no CICA stay if either the protest does not meet
the timeliness rules for a CICA stay or if there is an agency
override. See FAR 33.104(b), 33.104(c)(1) (indicating the
35

discretion not to impose a preliminary injunction.133

While

there are some protesters that start at the GAO and then go to
the Court of Federal Claims,134 the number is apparently so
small, and the evidence that the underlying procurements to
these protests have been substantially delayed is so thin
(again, there is no automatic right to a stay at the court135),
that this cannot legitimately be seen as a significant cost of
the bid protest system.

More importantly, the court

occasionally reaches a different outcome than the GAO did,136
which suggests, if nothing else, that the protest was not
frivolous.
Another concern about the cost of the protest system
relates to what might be called its indirect impact.

Fear of

protests is often given as the explanation for Contracting
Officers’ preference for certain courses of action over
timeliness rules for an automatic CICA stay); 31 U.S.C. §§
3553(c)(2), (d)(3)(C) (2006) (permitting an agency to override
the automatic stay in certain circumstances).
133
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (2006) (granting the Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief); Akal
Sec., Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 311, 316-17 (2009)
(delineating the factors considered in granting injunctive
relief).
134
See, e.g., Analytical & Research Tech., B-276064, 97-1 CPD ¶
200 (Comp. Gen. May 7, 1997); Analytical & Research Tech., Inc.,
39 Fed. Cl. 34, 40 (1997).
135
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(2) (2006).
136
See, e.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl.
561, 586 (2010) (holding that the Army acted improperly in
setting aside a previously awarded contract, pursuant to the
GAO’s recommendation).
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others.137

In particular, Contracting Officers have told the

author that they are acting to avoid bid protests when they
decide that a contract should be awarded to the lowest-priced,
technically acceptable (LPTA) proposal, rather than to allow for
a tradeoff.138

There does not appear to be any data that would

indicate how often Contracting Officers actually decide to make
an award on an LPTA basis for this reason alone, nor any data on
how often source selection officials avoid making tradeoffs in
award decisions, even when permitted to by the terms of a
solicitation, just to avoid protests.

If the phenomenon is

common, it is unfortunate, since discretion to make tradeoffs is
a positive option in the U.S. procurement system.139
Similarly, the author has heard for many years that some
Contracting Officers prefer to make award based on initial
proposals, rather than to conduct discussions, because they fear
that discussions with offerors are a legal minefield, such that
conducting discussions will increase the likelihood of a bid
protest and improve the protester’s chances of prevailing if a

137

See Myth-Busting, supra note 63, at 7 (noting that
Contracting Officers sometimes attempt to “protest-proof”
procurements when that should not be the overriding goal).
138
See generally FAR 15.101-1(a) (permitting agencies to use
tradeoff process when it would be “in the best interest of the
Government”).
139
See id.
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protest is filed.140

Again, that would represent a loss, since

the ability to conduct discussions with offerors is a good
feature of our acquisition system and is not often used in other
systems around the world.141

Similar to the extent to which

Contracting Officers use LPTA rather than tradeoff to avoid
protest, there is a lack of data about how common it is for
Contracting Officers to award based on initial proposals in
order to reduce the likelihood of a successful protest.

In any

event, the author is skeptical that there is any good reason to
“protest-proof” an acquisition in this way, especially in light
of how rare protests are, and how exceedingly rare successful
protests are.142

Moreover, neither using LPTA as the basis for

award, nor making award based on initial proposals, without
conducting discussions, will ensure that no protest will ever be

140

See, e.g., Rig Masters, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl.
413, 420 (2006) (holding that the Contracting Officer’s failure
to hold negotiations was not an abuse of discretion).
141
See Christopher R. Yukins, Integrating Integrity and
Procurement: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 307,
327-28, 328 n.70 (2007) (suggesting that the United States
preference for negotiated procurement is a strong advantage, but
is not widely used worldwide because the U.S. enjoys relatively
low levels of corruption); IVAR STRAND ET AL., PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN
EUROPE: COST AND EFFECTIVENESS 7, 15 (2011) (noting that the Eurozone
rarely uses negotiation); Shigeki Kusunoki, Japan’s Government
Procurement Regimes for Public Works: A Comparative
Introduction, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 523, 528 (2006) (noting that,
historically, negotiated procurements were rarely used in
Japan).
142
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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held, as GAO and Court of Federal Claims decisions ruling on
protests of LPTA awards and initial-proposal awards
demonstrate.143

That said, it must be recognized that in both

areas, and potentially in others as well, it is quite possible
that the fear of protests, whether justifiable or not, is
harming the acquisition system by driving bad decisions by
federal contracting personnel.

To mitigate this harm, efforts

should be made to improve Contracting Officers’ knowledge about
the rarity of protests and the fact that making LPTA awards or
awards based on initial proposals will not prevent protests, as
well as the benefit to the Government of using tradeoffs and
discussions as means to obtain a better deal for taxpayers.
VI.

Benefits of the Protest Process
As noted above, countries around the world are developing

bid protest systems, and such systems have become, or are fast
becoming, part of the norm for good government in the
acquisition arena.144

That can be attributed to several benefits

associated with bid protests.
First, protests introduce a relatively low-cost form of
accountability into acquisition systems by providing disgruntled
143

See, e.g., Guzar Mirbachakot Transp. v. United States, 104
Fed. Cl. 53 (2012) (lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA)
case at the CoFC); Ahtna Facility Servs., Inc., B-404913 et al.,
2011 CPD ¶ 134 (Comp. Gen. June 30, 2011) (LPTA case at the
GAO).
144
See discussion supra Part III.
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participants a forum for airing their complaints.145

Protesting

firms decide which procurements are to be investigated: if no
one protests, then neither the GAO nor the Court of Federal
Claims would look into a procurement, but if someone does
protest, then the GAO and the court would consider the
procurement if the protest passes procedural hurdles, such as
timeliness.146

While reliance on audits by government officials

would also inject accountability into the workings of
procurement systems, it may be more efficient to focus on
procurements where a participant is dissatisfied by a government
agency’s conduct; that is what the “private attorney general”
model of a protest provides.147

In blunt terms, if no one is

145

See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental
Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 681
(2001) (contending that “[i]n economic terms, the protest and
dispute regimes are a bargain” and that “[o]pponents of
litigation are hard pressed to demonstrate a more cost
effective, less intrusive compliance regime.”).
146
See 31 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (conferring jurisdiction on
the GAO to review procurements protested by an interested
party); id. § 3551(2) (defining “interested party” as “an actual
or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest
would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to
award the contract” or an agency official or agent representing
federal employees who stand to be injured by private
competition); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) (2006) (granting the Court
of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear claims brought by
“interested parties”); R. CT. FED. CL. (procedural rules governing
the Court of Federal Claims); 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1, .2 (2012)
(procedural rules governing bid protests at the GAO).
147
See Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (“The public interest in preventing the granting of
contracts through arbitrary or capricious action can properly be
40

dissatisfied with the way the Government conducted a
procurement, then it may not be a wise use of auditors’ time to
investigate it.148
Second, by being directly responsive to participants’
complaints, protests can increase potential bidders’ confidence
in the integrity of the procurement process, and thereby lead
more players to participate, thus increasing competition.149
Increasing competition, in turn, can translate into bidders
offering lower prices, higher quality, or both, to contracting
agencies.150
Third, protests can increase the public’s confidence in the
integrity of the public procurement process.

While the public

vindicated through a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a
result of the illegal activity, but the suit itself is brought
in the public interest by one acting essentially as a ‘private
attorney general.’”); Schooner, supra note 145, at 630, 680-84
(arguing that “private attorneys general” litigation is a public
good).
148
It should, though, be noted that in situations where all the
bidders are colluding, none may have an interest in protesting,
so that the protest system would not provide accountability in
that case. Indeed, if anything, in those situations protests
may serve as a means for colluding bidders to police their
collusive agreement. See Kovacic, supra note 3, at 490-91.
149
See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for
a System of Government Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103
(2002) [hereinafter Desiderata] (discussing the goals of a
procurement system, including competition).
150
See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Rumsfeld, 262 F.3d 649, 657
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that CICA, by requiring full and open
competition, was intended to “save money, curb cost growth,
promote innovation and the development of high quality
technology” (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 219 v.
Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 472 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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only rarely focuses on public contracting, having a protest
process mentioned in the press – as happened when The Boeing
Company successfully protested the Air Force’s award of a tanker
contract to Northrop Grumman151 - may raise the public’s trust in
the fairness of the Government’s acquisition system and the way
it spends taxpayer funds.
Fourth, because protests are a known avenue for complaints,
their availability empowers those in contracting agencies who
face pressure to act improperly.

Thus, if a Contracting Officer

were to be pressed by users within an agency to award a solesource contract to a favored firm, the Contracting Officer, who
may lack the bureaucratic clout to resist the pressure, could
point to the risk of a successful protest as one additional
reason to follow the statutory and regulatory requirements for
competition.152
Fifth, protest decisions, because they are public, and have
been released publicly since the GAO issued the first one in
1926,153 provide a high level of transparency into what is

151

See Boeing Co., B-311344 et al., 2008 CPD ¶ 114 (Comp. Gen.
June 18, 2008); Leslie Wayne, Audit Says Tanker Deal Is Flawed,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C1.
152
See generally Vernon J. Edwards & Ralph C. Nash, Jr.,
Postcript II: The Role of the Contracting Officer, 24 NASH &
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 15 (discussing pressures that Contracting Officers
routinely face).
153
See Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 5 Comp. Gen. 712 (1926).
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happening in the federal procurement system.154

While, in

theory, databases such as the Federal Procurement Data System
(FPDS) should provide transparency into the system,155 protest
decisions can often provide more useful information than
databases.

This is particularly the case where protests

demonstrate how problematic certain issues are.

For example,

when the GAO sustained a significant number of protests
challenging the way agencies were conducting public/private
competitions under OMB Circular A-76 in the 1990s, the
importance of improving the way those competitions were

154

See generally Desiderata, supra note 149 (describing
transparency as a goal of an effective procurement system).
155
The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) was created by the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in response to a
congressional requirement in the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy Act that the OFPP “establish[] a system for collecting,
developing, and disseminating procurement data which takes into
account the needs of the Congress, the executive branch, and the
private sector.” Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-400, § 6, 88 Stat. 796, 798 (1974) (codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1131 (Supp. IV 2010)); see also FAR 4.602
(describing the FPDS); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-960R,
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM-NEXT GENERATION 1-2
(2005) [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA
SYSTEM]. Although the FPDS is meant to provide transparency in
federal contracting by enabling the public and members of the
Government to access accurate data about government
procurements, the accuracy and timeliness of the data in the
FPDS have been criticized. See IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO THE FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM, supra, at 2-5; Letter from Sen. John F.
Kerry, U.S. Senator, to Robert A. Burton, Assoc. Adm’r of the
Office of Fed. Procurement Policy (Nov. 14, 2005), available at
http://asbl.com/asbl.resource/content/supdoc/kerry_letter.pdf
(noting several limitations of the Federal Procurement Data
System that hinder transparency).
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conducted was highlighted, and the decisions ultimately led to
revisions to the Circular as well as the creation of the
congressionally-chartered Commercial Activities Panel.156
Similarly, it was the GAO sustaining of a number of protests
alleging organizational conflicts of interest that focused
attention on this area and may have led to congressional and
regulatory action.157
Finally, the fact that protest decisions are published and
widely read by practitioners brings an additional benefit: the
decisions provide guidance, particularly to agency counsel and
attorneys representing potential protesters, as well as to their
156

Following a number of the GAO bid protest decisions arising
from public/private competitions under OMB Circular A-76, the
Congress created the Commercial Activities Panel through the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001. See Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 832, 114 Stat. 1654,
1654A-221 (2000); COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, IMPROVING THE SOURCING
DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT: FINAL REPORT 90-99 (2002) (summarizing GAO
protest decisions arising from public/private competitions under
OMB Circular A-76). The Panel recommended a number of changes,
many of which were adopted in the 2003 revision of OMB Circular
A-76. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PANEL, IMPROVING THE SOURCING DECISIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT 51-52 ((2002).
157
See Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A
Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 32-41 (2005)
(discussing organizational conflict of interest bid protests).
Section 207 of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009 (WSARA) called for tightening of the rules governing
organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs). See Pub. L. No.
111-23, § 207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728. As of the time of this
writing, a proposed rule is being considered to revise the FAR
provisions on OCIs. FAR Case 2011-001, Federal Acquisition
Regulation: Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg.
23,236 (proposed Apr. 26, 2011) (proposed rule) (to be codified
at FAR pts. 2-4, 7, 9, 11-16, 18, 37, 42, 52-53).
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clients.

To give just one example that has been true for

decades: any corporate counsel who follows GAO bid protest
decisions knows how strictly the GAO applies the “late is late”
rule,158 so that counsel will ensure that their client
appreciates the importance of submitting bids on time.
VII. Conclusion: The Costs of the Bid Protest System are
Overstated, and the System’s Benefits Outweigh Them
As explained above, the costs that bid protests impose on
the acquisition system are often misunderstood and therefore
overstated, in terms of the frequency of protests, the length of
time that they last, and the risk that an agency’s choice of
contractor will be overturned in the process.

Moreover, the

benefits of the protest system may not be fully appreciated, as
is the fact that the United States is required by its
international trade agreements to have a protest system.
Whatever costs protests impose on the procurement system are
outweighed, at least in the author’s view, by the benefits that
protests bring, in terms of transparency, accountability,
education, and protection of the integrity of the U.S. federal
acquisition system.

158

See Gregg A. Engler, Limiting Application of the Late
Proposal Rule: One Time, One Place, One Method, ARMY LAW., Oct.
2003, at 15. See generally FAR 15.208(b)(1) (providing that
proposals, modifications, and revisions are considered “late” if
received after the time specified).
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Appendix A: Agency Did Not Redo the Protest Procurement

GAO Did Not Recommend that the Agency Redo the
Procurement159
A1

Biblia, Inc., B-403006, 2010 CPD ¶ 203 (Comp. Gen.
Sept. 13, 2010) (protested work completed prior to
issuance of GAO decision).

A2

RBC Bearings Inc., B-401661 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 207
(Comp. Gen. Oct. 27, 2009) (agency had overridden the
stay and made award notwithstanding the protest).

A3

Bruce Bancroft—Agency Tender Official, B-400404.7 et
al., 2010 CPD ¶ 9 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 17, 2009).

A4

Frank A. Bloomer—Agency Tender Official, B-401482.2
et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 203 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 19, 2009).

Agency Declined to Follow GAO’s Recommendation160
A5

Rice Servs., Inc., B-403746, 2010 CPD ¶ 220 (Comp.
Gen. Sept. 16, 2010).

A6

Rice Servs., Inc., B-402966.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 217 (Comp.
Gen. Sept. 16, 2010).

A7

DGR Assocs., Inc., B-402494, 2010 CPD ¶ 115 (Comp.
Gen. May 14, 2010).

159

Note that A3 and A4 involved protests of public-private
competitions, where the federal employees’ representative won
the protest and may have been satisfied that no further
competition would be held.
160
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-211SP, GAO’S BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (2010).
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Appendix B: Agency Took Corrective Action, but Protester did not
get the Protested Contract
B1

Analysis Grp., LLC, B-401726 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 237
(Comp. Gen. Nov. 13, 2009); Analysis Grp., LLC, B401726.3, 2011 CPD ¶ 166 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 18, 2011)
(denying protest of agency’s implementation of the
GAO’s recommendation in the earlier, sustained
protest, where the agency’s implementation led it to
confirm award to the original awardee).

B2

Port of Bellingham, B-401837, 2009 CPD ¶ 245 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 2, 2009); Press Release, Port of Newport,
Port Commission Briefed on Construction Progress for
International Terminal Renovation and NOAA MOC-P
Projects (Sept. 29, 2010).

B3

Navistar Def., LLC, B-401865 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 258
(Comp. Gen. Dec. 14, 2009); FMTV 2010-2015: Pyrrhic
Victories? Oshkosh Wins the Re-Compete, DEF. INDUS.
DAILY (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/FMTV-2010-2015Oshkosh-Wins-The-Re-Compete-05744#US-Army-vehicles.

B4

Velos, Inc., B-400500.8 et al., 2009 CPD ¶ 13 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 14, 2009); Velos, Inc., B-400500.11 (Comp.
Gen. May 26, 2011) (unpublished decision) (on file
with author).

B5

Coastal Env’ts, Inc., B-401889, 2009 CPD ¶ 261 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 18, 2009); Letter from Linda M. Fredendall,
Contracting Officer, Dep’t of the Army, to Victor
Palma, Ecological Communications Corporation (Feb.
15, 2010) (reaffirming award to original awardee) (on
file with author).

B6

C&B Constr., Inc., B-401988.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 1 (Comp.
Gen. Jan. 6, 2010); Letter from Cynthia B. Armour,
Contracting Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., to Mike
Herrick & Justin Isle, Aquatic Contracting (May 25,
2010) (on file with author) (awardee’s task order
terminated, with work expected to be added to a
future task order).

B7

McKissack+Delcan JV II, B-401973.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶
28 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13, 2010); Letter from Carolyn A.
Horne, Contracting Officer, Fed. Transit Admin., to
Brian Stearman, McKissack & Delcan Joint Venture II
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(June 4, 2010) (on file with author) (exclusion of
protester’s proposal confirmed).
B8

Gen. Dynamics One Source, LLC, B-400340.5 et al.,
2010 CPD ¶ 45 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 20, 2010); Unisys
Corp., B-400340.9 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 171 (Comp. Gen.
July 27, 2010) (denying protest after agency
implemented the GAO’s recommendation, but still made
award to the original awardee).

B9

Cahaba Safeguard Adm’rs, LLC, B-401842.2, 2010 CPD ¶
39 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 25, 2010); C2C Solutions, Inc.,
B-401106.6, 2010 CPD ¶ 145, at 5 n.5 (Comp. Gen. June
21, 2010) (denying protest of the way agency
implemented the GAO’s recommended corrective action
in sustained protests - both in Cahaba and C2C, infra
B10 - where the effect of the agency’s method
apparently allowed the original awardee to keep the
protested contract).

B10

C2C Solutions, Inc., B-401106.5, 2010 CPD ¶ 38 (Comp.
Gen. Jan. 25, 2010); C2C Solutions, Inc., B-401106.5
et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 145 (Comp. Gen. June 12, 2010)
(denying protest of the way agency implemented the
GAO’s recommended corrective action in sustained
protests –both in C2C and Cahaba, supra B9 – where
the effect of the agency’s method apparently allowed
the original awardee to keep the protested contract).

B11

McCarthy/Hunt, JV, B-402229.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 68 (Comp.
Gen. Feb. 16, 2010); Turner Constr. Co. v. United
States, 94 Fed. Cl. 561, 586 (2010), aff’d 645 F.3d
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the GAO’s analysis
and effectively reinstating award to the original
awardee).

B12

B.L. Harbert-Brasfield & Gorrie, JV, B-402229, 2010
CPD ¶ 69 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 16, 2010) (a separate
decision on the same procurement as McCarthy/Hunt,
supra B11, and also effectively reversed through the
courts’ decisions in Turner Constr. Co., supra B11).

B13

Med. Dev. Int’l, Inc., B-402198.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 185
(Comp. Gen. Mar. 29, 2010); Comprehensive Medical
Services – FCC Terre Haute, FEDBIZOPPS (June 8, 2011),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=7f95e6ef952104fd783510846ce50d17 (corrective
action resulted in award to original awardee).
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B14

B15

B16

B17

B18

B19

B20
B21

J2A 2 JV, LLC, B-401663.4, 2010 CPD ¶ 102 (Comp. Gen.
Apr. 19, 2010), Y-Sarasota National Cemetery Phase 1B
Development Sarasota, Florida, FEDBIZOPPS (Dec. 23,
2010),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=
0aba165105ae9b45415bd9f0c7bb1a55&tab=core&_cview=1
(indicating that the agency apparently issued a new
solicitation and awarded contracts to two companies,
neither the protester nor the awardee).
Contrack Int’l, Inc., B-401871.5 et al., 2010 CPD ¶
126 (Comp. Gen. May 24, 2010); Memorandum from Dir.,
Joint Eng’r Directorate, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to
the U.S. Forces Army Cent. (USARCENT), Kuwait G7
(Oct. 7, 2012) (on file with author) (solicitation
cancelled).
JER 370 Third St., LLC, B-402025 et al., 2010 CPD ¶
120 (Comp. Gen. June 1, 2010); U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
U.S. GOV’T LEASE FOR REAL PROPERTY, LEASE NO. GS-09B-GS-09B02312 (June 1, 2011) (on file with author) (contract
awarded to different offeror).
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., B-402550.2, 2010 CPD ¶ 204
(Comp. Gen. June 7, 2010); Armed Guard Service – DEA
HQ and Labs VA and MD, FEDBIZOPPS (Apr. 28, 2011),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=b238d4ac2f13cecf300586b571e630e7&_cview=0
(corrective action resulted in award to original
awardee).
MPRI, Div. of L-3 Servs., Inc., B-402548 et al.,
2010 CPD ¶ 108 (Comp. Gen. June 4, 2010); Contract
Actions Matching “w91crb09r0009,” FPDS.GOV,
https://www.fpds.gov/dbsight/search.do?indexName=awar
dfull&templateName=1.4.4&s=FPDSNG.COM&q=w91crb09r0009
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (award remained with
original awardee).
Sys. Eng’g Int’l, Inc, B-402754, 2010 CPD ¶ 167
(Comp. Gen. July 20, 2010); Contract No. EP10HO1229,
Modification No. 0003, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency
(Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with author).
DRS ICAS, LLC, B-401852.4 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 261
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 8, 2010).
Info. Ventures, Inc., B-403321, 2010 CPD ¶ 223 (Comp.
Gen. Sept. 27, 2010); Mission Support Services for
Preparation of Toxicological Profiles, FEDBIZOPPS (Nov.
19, 2010), https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&
mode=form&id=a3e74cdbe8ae50d896268cb7559b0f65&tab=cor
re&_cview=1 (solicitation cancelled Nov. 19, 2010).
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B22

B23

Shaw-Parson Infrastructure Recovery Consultants, B401679 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 77 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 10,
2010); Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants,
LLC, B-401679.8 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 2100 (Comp. Gen.
Sept. 8, 2010) (stating that the agency implemented
the GAO’s recommendation, but selected the same firms
for award as earlier).
Shaw-Parsons Infrastructure Recovery Consultants,
LLC, B-401679.8 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 211(Comp. Gen.
Sept. 8, 2010) (challenging the reevaluation of the
procurement pursuant to the Shaw-Parson decision,
supra B22); Public Assistance Technical Assitance
Contract (PA TAC III), FEDBIZOPPS (June 15, 2009),
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=08fce
ab6b86734c234917a77eda5a564&tab=core&_cview=1.
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Appendix C: Agency Took Corrective Action, and Protester
Obtained either the Protested Contract or the Specific Relief
Requested
C1

AINS, Inc., B-400760 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 32 (Comp.
Gen. Jan. 19, 2010) (sustaining protested award of a
single blanket purchase agreement to a firm other
than the protester); AINS, Inc., B-405902.3, 2012 CPD
¶ 189, at 1 (Comp. Gen. May 31, 2012) (stating that
both AINS and the other firm have blanket purchase
agreements for what appear to be the services at
issue in the protest).

C2

Humana Military Healthcare Servs., B-401652.2 et al.,
2009 CPD ¶ 219 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 28, 2009) (sustaining
protest of award to another firm); UnitedHealth
Military & Veterans Servs., LLC, B-401652.8 et al.,
2012 CPD ¶ 83 (Comp. Gen. June 14, 2011) (denying
protest of another firm challenging award to Humana,
the earlier protester).

C3

Health Net Fed. Servs., LLC, B-401652.3 et al., 2009
CPD ¶ 220 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 4, 2009); TRICARE Third
Generation Managed Care Support Services for the
North Region, FEDBIZOPPS (May 18, 2010),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id-2306443561cd2064ef5f946a03fb1b55 (award to
protester).

C4

Ewing Constr. Co., B-401887.3 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 108
(Comp. Gen. Apr. 26, 2010); Contract No. N69450-10-C0789, NAVFAC Se. (Aug. 10, 2010) (on file with
author).

C5

AMEC Earth & Envtl., Inc., B-401961 et al., 2010 CPD
¶ 141 (Comp. Gen. Dec. 22, 2009); Nat’l Multiple
Award Constr. Contract Contact Information, U.S.
Coast Guard (on file with author) (protester awarded
one of multiple-award contracts).

C6

Milani Constr., LLC, B-401942, 2009 CPD ¶ 87 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 22, 2009); Rehabilitate Anacostia Park,
National Capital Parks East, FEDBIZOPPS (Apr. 5, 2010),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=1a5812911b516e2840156e2907c715c5&_cview=0.

C7

Irving Burton Assocs., Inc., B-401983.3, 2010 CPD ¶
92 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with author)
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(agency documents indicate former awardee’s task
order terminated for convenience of the government
and task order awarded to protester).
C8

PMO P’ship Joint Venture, B-401973.3 et al., 2010 CPD
¶ 29 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 14, 2010); Project Management
Oversight, FEDBIZOPPS (Jan. 21, 2011),
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab
=core&id=1a5812911b516e2840156e2907c715c5&_cview=0.

C9

Eagle Home Med. Corp., B-402387, 2010 CPD ¶ 82 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 29, 2010) (information the author obtained
through a Freedom of Information Act request
indicates that the agency cancelled the solicitation
and stated that it would resolicit using the size
standard that the protester advocated; it is unknown
whether protester ultimately received the contract).
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Appendix D: Ultimate Outcome Not Yet Identified
D1

Brican Inc., B-402602, 2010 CPD ¶ 141 (Comp. Gen.
June 17, 2010).

D2

Powersolv, Inc., B-402534 et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 206
(Comp. Gen. June 1, 2010).

D3

DynCorp Int’l LLC, B-402349, 2010 CPD ¶ 59 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 15, 2010).

D4

Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., B-401773, 2009 CPD ¶
229 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 10, 2009) (agency implemented
recommendation and then made award to protester,
but that award was successfully protested by
earlier awardee in Rapiscan Sys., Inc., B-401773.2
et al., 2010 CPD ¶ 60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15, 2010),
and the ultimate outcome has not yet been
identified.

D5

Rapiscan Sys., Inc., B-401773.2 et al., 2010 CPD ¶
60 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 15, 2010).

D6

Am. Sec. Programs, Inc., B-402069 et al., 2010 CPD
¶ 2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 15, 2010).
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